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The U.S. Supreme Court sparked immense public opposition in 1962 with its decision in
the case Engel v. Vitale. The Court had ruled that school-sponsored prayer in public schools
violated the First Amendment, even if it was a brief nondenominational prayer.1 In addition to
inciting widespread public backlash, the ruling prompted a question regarding the separation of
church and state, and religious liberty more generally in America: did the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause call for the government to refrain from the realm of religion, or did it
simply require that the government be impartial among religions when involving itself in
religious matters?
Since 1962, Americans have looked to the U.S. Supreme Court time and time again for a
clear and consistent answer. While the Court has ruled on a number of cases that involve religion
and schooling, and the separation of church and state more generally, it has not provided a clear,
predictable doctrine on the issue. That situation has encouraged ever more litigation in that area
of law before the U.S. Supreme Court. Simultaneously, state supreme courts have taken up the
issue in their own cases. Scholarship on cases concerning the separation of church and state,
however, has focused almost entirely on cases at the federal level.
By looking at cases involving religion and education that have come before three
regionally representative state supreme courts— those of California, Ohio, and Virginia— this
thesis will provide for a more thorough account of U.S. constitutional history in this area. An
analysis of these state supreme court cases might additionally have prescriptive value, illustrating
rulings and doctrines that have been effective and could be adopted on a federal level. By
examining these issues at the state supreme court level, this research also aims to provide insight
into the role and usefulness of state supreme courts in the U.S. judicial system. This can help
1 “Facts and Case Summary - Engel v. Vitale.” United States Courts.
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academics and the public determine whether they ought to give greater consideration to state
supreme courts as essential actors in U.S. constitutional history and effective instruments in
resolving constitutional disputes.
2. State Supreme Courts in Academic Literature
When most Americans conceptualize their rights, they likely picture the U.S.
Constitution, and alongside it the U.S Supreme Court, as the ultimate judicial protectors.
Likewise, narratives of U.S. constitutional history often treat amendments to the U.S.
Constitution and rulings by the U.S. Supreme Court as encompassing the whole story. When the
Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 to write what became the U.S. Constitution, however, they
and the general public envisioned state supreme courts and state constitutions as the most
important guardians of Americans’ liberties.
Recent scholarship has called attention to this disparity, asserting the significance of state
supreme courts and state constitutions in making U.S. constitutional history and their potential to
resolve contemporary issues. In his book 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of
American Constitutional Law, U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Jeffrey Sutton writes that “virtually
all of the foundational liberties that protect Americans originated in the state constitutions.”2
Judge Sutton provides accounts of different issues in U.S. constitutional history. In all cases, he
describes state supreme courts as important actors in U.S. constitutional history. He also claims
that the U.S. judicial system would be more effective at meeting the needs of the public if people
began looking more towards state supreme courts and constitutions for solutions, rather than the
U.S. Supreme Court and Constitution.
2 Sutton, Judge Jeffrey. 51 Imperfect Solutions: States and the Making of American Constitutional Law. Oxford
University Press, 2018. pp.1.
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In his view, many of the constitutional issues debated today would be better dealt with by
having solutions first developed at the state level. He claims that this would allow any issues that
arise from judicial decisions or constitutional amendments to be resolved by states before being
implemented at the national level. Furthermore, he explains that starting at the state level allows
for experimentation: different state supreme courts will come up with their own solutions,
providing a number of judicial remedies for federal courts to consider. This conception of the
states as laboratories has long been popular among political scientists.3 Additionally, state
supreme courts, he argues, can craft decisions that are more tailored to their state’s population—
a factor he views as significant, given the significant state and regional diversity of the country.4
Judge Sutton is not alone in his belief that state supreme courts should be looked to more
often. In her book Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain
America’s Positive Rights, Dr. Emily Zackin, a political historian, writes that state constitutions
and state supreme courts have been the sources of some of the most important social reforms in
American history. She further argues that current progressive concepts, such as the right to a
living wage or the right to certain educational opportunities, will be best realized in state
constitutions and state supreme courts. 5
These works, among others, make a compelling argument for giving more consideration
to state supreme courts in the study of U.S. constitutional history and the pursuit of judicial
solutions. Their central premise—that a greater emphasis on state supreme courts would enhance
the judicial system— has not, however, been thoroughly scrutinized. While a full investigation
5 Zackin, Emily J. Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain Americas Positive
Rights. Princeton University Press, 2013.
4 Sutton, Judge Jeffrey. 51 Imperfect Solutions. pp. 2-5.
3 Shipan, C., & Volden, C. (2008). The Mechanisms of Policy Diffusion. American Journal of Political Science,
52(4), 840-857. Retrieved April 2, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/25193853
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into the merits of their views would be of extraordinary scope, a focused analysis on a particular
and important issue in U.S. constitutional history can still provide useful insight.
Through an examination of how state supreme courts have dealt with cases involving
religion and schooling since Engel v. Vitale, this thesis will assess whether federalism works
better as a guiding principle in addressing such cases. Additionally, it will comparatively assess
state supreme courts, observing whether certain courts and regions are more innovative than
others or more prone to protecting individual rights. In creating an account of religion and
education cases at the state level, this analysis will also contribute to a more comprehensive view
of U.S. constitutional history in this area.
3. Methodology and Sources
This thesis will assess the value of state supreme courts by analyzing the history of
religion and schooling at the state level, since Engel v. Vitale. This area of U.S. constitutional
history is well suited for this purpose because it is not decidedly divided along political party
lines. Cases involving issues such as the right to an abortion or the right to possess a firearm
would likely, in contrast, be more cleanly split between states based on their majoritarian
political ideology. While cases involving religion and education have likely been affected by
political ideology, the variance in religious populations among states suggests more idiosyncratic
judicial solutions can be expected on this issue. This also presents an opportunity to observe
whether state supreme courts have tailored their decisions on this issue to their distinctive
populations.
The ambiguity in the U.S. Supreme Court’s separation of church and state doctrine also
makes this issue ideal. Amid this federal ambiguity, one can observe whether state supreme
courts have come up with their own solutions and whether these solutions have informed rulings
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at the federal level. Consequently, the state supreme court proponents’ claim—that state supreme
courts will experiment with different judicial remedies and provide insight to federal courts—can
be scrutinized.
Another reason for examining cases concerning religion and schooling, and the
separation of church and state more generally, is that they are ongoing. These issues have
continued to come before the U.S. Supreme Court since Engel v. Vitale, and though they have
evolved over the years, the debate over the meaning of the Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment continues. Therefore an analysis of this historical issue, one which looks towards
activity at the state level, might offer some insight into how this area of U.S. constitutional
history will develop going forward.
The states that will be used for this analysis— California, Ohio, and Virginia —provide
political and regional variance; they also each offer several cases involving religion and
schooling issues. Their state supreme courts will be evaluated based on how many cases of the
same nature have arisen. If several cases involving religion and schooling issues came before a
court, for example, and each time the legal questions at play were similar, then that suggests the
court had not been clear in establishing a doctrine on the issue.
Furthermore, the state supreme courts will be evaluated with regards to their
consistency—whether their rulings are based on a coherent rationale or whether their rulings
seem more ad hoc. These same standards will be applied to the cases involving religion and
education that have come before the U.S. Supreme Court. This will allow for both a comparison
among state supreme courts and a comparison between state supreme courts and the U.S.
Supreme Court. The courts that have been more consistent and clear in their rulings will be
regarded as more successful in resolving this constitutional dispute. This will allow for an
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assessment of whether state supreme courts have filled in the gaps left by the U.S. Supreme
Court on this issue. Likewise, it will also offer insight into whether any of the judicial remedies
crafted by state supreme courts can inform rulings at the federal level.
Additionally, the state supreme court proponents’ argument is a normative one: a greater
emphasis on state supreme courts will lead to a better judicial system. This can simply mean a
judicial system that has greater consistency and clarity in its judicial rulings, but a better judicial
system would, evidently, also better serve the public. One way to try and take this into account is
by examining instances in which judicial rulings on religion and education issues have incited
protests or prompted legislative backlash. Such evidence would indicate that a court’s judicial
ruling did not satisfy the public, which might suggest the judicial remedy was unfavorable.
This thesis will begin with an introductory overview that gives context to the issues
surrounding state supreme court cases concerning religion and education, mainly using
secondary sources. This will include a discussion of the major U.S. Supreme Court cases in this
area, from Engel v. Vitale to the present. It will also include some discussion of the broader
political climate surrounding church and state relations cases. One source that will be used for
contextualizing Engel v. Vitale is Bruce Dierenfield’s book, The Battle Over School Prayer. The
book examines Engel closely, including interviews with the parties involved in the case,
historicizing the case facts, and explaining the legal components of the case and how the U.S.
Supreme Court arrived at its decision.6
Additionally, James W. Fraser’s book, Between Church and State: Religion and Public
Education in a Multicultural America, discusses U.S. Supreme Court cases involving religion
and public schools since Engel. The book looks at these cases as part of a broader church and
6 Dierenfield, Bruce J. The Battle over School Prayer: How Engel v. Vitale Changed America. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2007.
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state relations issue, discussing debates over prayer, creationism, and voucher programs as they
relate to public education. Steven Waldman’s book, Sacred Liberty: America’s Long, Bloody, and
Ongoing Struggle for Religious Freedom, also offers a useful background for church and state
relations in America. It is particularly helpful in supplying information about the role
non-Christian religions have played in church and state issues generally and in public education
issues more specifically.7
Other sources that will assist with contextualization include Steven Jones’s book,
Religious Schooling in America, which breaks down the distinction between private and public
education and how it is importantly related to the issues of religion and schooling.8 Robert
Alley’s book, School Prayer: The Court, the Congress, and the First Amendment, contains many
useful materials as well. It has, for example, transcripts from Senate and House committee
hearings and debates that were in response to U.S. Supreme Court decisions on cases involving
church and state relations issues.9 The book Religion and the Law: A Dictionary by Christopher
Anglim will also be a useful source, as it provides descriptions of all cases that have come before
the U.S. Supreme Court in which religion was a central issue and contains information regarding
legal concepts that are important for understanding these cases.10
Once this overview is finished, primary source materials will be used to create a
historical account of the cases involving religion and schooling that have come before state
supreme courts in California, Virginia, and Ohio. Principal primary sources for this account
include the state supreme courts’ various rulings in these cases. Materials available from a case,
such as transcripts of interviews with the parties involved or briefs submitted to the court, will
10 Anglim, C. (1999). Religion and the law: A dictionary. Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio.
9 Alley, R. S. (1996). School prayer: The Court, the Congress, and the First Amendment. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus
Books.
8 Jones, S. L. (2008). Religious schooling in America: Private education and public life. Westport, CT: Praeger.
7 Waldman, S. (2020). Sacred Liberty: America's long, bloody, and ongoing struggle for religious freedom. San
Francisco: Harper One.
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also be used. Newspaper and journal articles about a case, if available, will also help to construct
the historical narrative. Other important source materials will pertain to the state supreme court
justices who decided the case, particularly how they were selected and retained. Data that
provides insight into each state population’s religious makeup will also be used for context.
4. Overview of the State Supreme Court Cases
There are five cases involving religion and schooling that have come before the Supreme
Court of California since Engel v. Vitale. Each one of them will be examined. The first one is
California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, which was decided in 1974. The case
involved the California Educational Facilities Authority Act, which allowed public funds to go to
private universities. The question before the Supreme Court of California was whether this
would entangle the state government with religion, in violation of the U.S. Constitution and the
California Constitution, since some private universities had religious affiliations.11 The second
case concerning religion and schooling that came before the Supreme Court of California was
Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence of Ducor Union School District, which was
decided in 1979. This case involved a school teacher who requested that his absences on
religious holidays that he observed be permitted. When the school district denied his request, he
sued, claiming that his religious liberties had been violated. In making his argument, the teacher
also claimed that there had been a breach of the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause.12
The third case that will be examined for California is California Teachers Association v.
Riles, which was decided in 1981. The case involved the constitutionality of a statute which
allowed the state to lend textbooks to students who were not attending public schools—
12 Rankins v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence of Ducor Union Sch. Dist., 24 Cal. 3d 167, 593 P.2d 852, 154 Cal. Rptr.
907, 1979 Cal. LEXIS 249, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 925, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P9234 (Supreme Court
of California April 30, 1979 ).
11 California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, 12 Cal. 3d 593, 526 P.2d 513, 116 Cal. Rptr. 361, 1974 Cal.
LEXIS 248 (Supreme Court of California September 25, 1974 ).
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including those attending private, religious schools.13 The fourth case is Sands v. Morongo
Unified School District, and it was decided ten years later, in 1991. A public high school had
included prayers as part of its graduation ceremony. The prayers had not been directed towards
any particular religion. At issue was whether this practice violated the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause.14
The fifth and latest case involving religion and schooling to come before the Supreme
Court of California is California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons
Interested etc., which was decided in 2007. The state had allowed religious schools to issue
bonds that were tax exempt so that they could develop their campus facilities. At issue was
whether this violated the Establishment Clause.15
There are four cases involving religion and schooling that have come before Ohio’s
Supreme Court since Engel. The first is Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of
Church & State v. Essex, which came before the Court in 1971. At issue was the constitutionality
of a bill that granted money to religious schools.16 The Supreme Court of Ohio later ruled on the
case State v. Whisner in 1976. Parents of a child who attended a private religious school had been
sanctioned by Ohio, which alleged that the school did not meet the State’s minimum education
standards. In turn, the parents sued the State, claiming that the education standards had violated
their religious liberties.17
17 State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750, 1976 Ohio LEXIS 686, 1 Ohio Op. 3d 105 (Supreme Court
of Ohio July 28, 1976, Decided ).
16 Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Essex, 28 Ohio St. 2d 79, 275 N.E.2d
603, 1971 Ohio LEXIS 412, 57 Ohio Op. 2d 263 (Supreme Court of Ohio November 24, 1971, Decided ).
15 California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc., 40 Cal. 4th 788, 152 P.3d
1070, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 487, 2007 Cal. LEXIS 1914, 2007 Daily Journal DAR 2998, 2007 Cal. Daily Op. Service
2368 (Supreme Court of California March 5, 2007, Filed ).
14 Sands v. Morongo Unified School Dist., 53 Cal. 3d 863, 809 P.2d 809, 281 Cal. Rptr. 34, 1991 Cal. LEXIS 1724,
91 Daily Journal DAR 5389, 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3328 (Supreme Court of California May 6, 1991 ).
13 Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Riles, 29 Cal. 3d 794, 632 P.2d 953, 176 Cal. Rptr. 300, 1981 Cal. LEXIS 172 (Supreme
Court of California August 27, 1981 ).
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In the third case, Simmons-Harris v. Goff, an appropriations bill passed by the Ohio
legislature in 1995 was challenged before Ohio’s Supreme Court in 1999. The bill contained a
school voucher program, which provided funding for students to attend private religious schools.
Consequently, one of the central issues of the case was whether the Establishment Clause had
been violated.18
The most recent case involving religion and schooling in Ohio is Freshwater v. Mount
Vernon City School District Board of Education, which came before the Court in 2013. A teacher
kept a Bible in his desk and had placed other religious paraphernalia around his classroom. He
was asked by the principal to remove all of these religious items, and when he refused, he was
fired. At issue was whether his religious liberties had been violated and whether his placement of
religious items in the classroom constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.19
There are four cases concerning religion and schooling that have come before Virginia’s
Supreme Court since Engel. The first two cases, Miller v. Ayres (1972) and Miller v. Ayres
(1973), pitted the State’s Attorney General against its Comptroller. They both involved state
legislation that provided financial aid to students attending religious colleges; a central issue in
both cases was whether this violated the Establishment Clause.20 21 In 1991, Virginia’s Supreme
Court considered a similar issue in Habel v. Industrial Development Authority. A city had issued
bonds to supply funds to a religious college in the area. Consequently, the question of whether
this violated the Establishment Clause came before the Court.22 The most recent case to come
22 Habel v. Industrial Dev. Authority, 241 Va. 96, 400 S.E.2d 516, 1991 Va. LEXIS 5, 7 Va. Law Rep. 1334
(Supreme Court of Virginia January 11, 1991 ).
21 Miller v. Ayres, 214 Va. 171, 198 S.E.2d 634, 1973 Va. LEXIS 277 (Supreme Court of Virginia August 30, 1973 ).
20 Miller v. Ayres, 213 Va. 251, 191 S.E.2d 261, 1972 Va. LEXIS 344 (Supreme Court of Virginia September 1, 1972
).
19 Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 137 Ohio St. 3d 469, 2013-Ohio-5000, 1 N.E.3d 335,
2013 Ohio LEXIS 2685, 37 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 328, 2013 WL 6067987 (Supreme Court of Ohio November 19,
2013, Decided).
18 Simmons-Harris v. Goff, 86 Ohio St. 3d 1, 1999-Ohio-77, 711 N.E.2d 203, 1999 Ohio LEXIS 1893 (Supreme
Court of Ohio May 27, 1999, Decided ).
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before Virginia’s Supreme Court is Virginia College Building Authority v. Lynn, which was
decided in 2000. A state building authority had given bonds to a private religious university, per
Virginia’s Educational Facilities Authority Act. The issue before the Court was whether the Act
constituted a violation of the Establishment Clause.23
In addition to these cases, other cases regarding the Establishment Clause outside the
realm of education that have come before the three state supreme courts will be noted. Though
such cases do not directly pertain to issues concerning religion and schooling, they may further
contextualize the development of each state’s church and state doctrine.
5. Religion and Education Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court: From Engel to the Present
In 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in the case Everson v. Board of Education that the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment applied to the states.24 Prior to this ruling, the
Establishment Clause only applied to the federal government; the Everson decision meant the
Supreme Court could now rule on whether state laws were constitutional with regards to the
Establishment Clause. This opened the door for the Court to start developing its separation of
church and state doctrine—the case Engel v. Vitale would be a major step in starting that
development.
The case involved a New York state school prayer, which the New York Board of
Regents had decided to adopt in 1951. At the time, the national juvenile crime rate was
increasing, and the first baby boomers turned five in 1951, which marked the beginning of a
trend towards greater numbers of children in the public school system. Furthermore, stories of
government wrongdoing had become widespread as the country, provoked by Congress, began to
24 Everson v. Board of Education (February 10, 1947).
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep330/usrep330001/usrep330001.pdf
23 Virginia College Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn, 260 Va. 608, 538 S.E.2d 682, 2000 Va. LEXIS 147 (Supreme Court of
Virginia November 3, 2000).
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root out communist sympathizers in government, and the news broke stories of low level
malfeasances by some Truman Administration officials. The new school prayer, the Board
hoped, would help foster moral training in the New York City public school system. The prayer
was carefully construed. It left out any explicit Christian reference and thus was deemed
“nondenominational,” although it did reference a singular God, and used the adjective
“Almighty,” which had theological implications that not all believers accepted. Schools were
allowed to decide whether to use the prayer, and students could choose not to participate in it.25
The plaintiff who would initiate the eventual case Engel v. Vitale was a non-practicing
Jew named Lawrence Roth. As a child, Roth had felt like an outcast in his predominantly
Christian school and had grown up dealing with anti-Semitic remarks. It was important to him,
therefore, that religion and public schools exist in two distinct spheres, and he took an active role
in his children’s education. Roth had long been upset that his children’s public school engaged in
Christmas celebrations, involving Christmas trees, Christmas music, and parties; when his school
district chose to recite the New York state prayer at the beginning of classroom instruction in
1958, Roth decided that that was the last straw. He contacted the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), which had received complaints about the prayer for some time, but had never found an
individual willing to serve as a plaintiff for a lawsuit due to the public hostility such a person
might face. Lawrence Roth would not be turned away so easily. He agreed to serve as a plaintiff
and was represented by an ACLU attorney named William Butler, who himself was Jewish.
Butler wanted a religiously diverse array of plaintiffs for the case, and Roth began recruiting
those he knew. Among those recruited was one of Roth’s neighbors, Steven Engel. Engel was a
25 Dierenfield 67-68.
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Jewish man who felt that prayer was sacred and personal, and he believed that making prayer a
habitual school practice would diminish it.26
William Vitale, the president of the school board, would serve as the defendant in the
case. The plaintiffs argued that the school prayer violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, which states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”27 Since the government had composed the prayer and public schools had promoted its
use, the plaintiffs argued that the prayer constituted an unlawful entanglement of government and
religion. The defendants, on the other hand, argued that the Establishment Clause was meant to
prevent the government from establishing a state church, and therefore the school prayer was
constitutional, because it did not privilege any specific religious denomination. They added,
furthermore, that schools had not been forced to use the prayer and that students in schools that
did had not been forced to pray.
On its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiffs lost every time; the lower courts
sided with the defendants, reasoning that the prayer was constitutional since it did not endorse a
particular religious sect, did not constitute part of classroom instruction, and students were not
forced to participate in it. Eventually the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. In their
briefs for the Court, the plaintiffs shifted the focus of their argument, emphasizing that the prayer
was unlawfully sectarian since it favored the beliefs of theists over atheists, and since its
reference to a singular God favored some thesists over others. The school board, in rebuttal,
argued that the U.S. Constitution did not exclude prayer nor religion from public life altogether.




Furthermore, the school board argued that the prayer was voluntary and did not subject students
to formal religious teaching, and that therefore the First Amendment had not been violated.28
On June 25th, 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs in a vote of
six to one, (one Justice was hospitalized and unable to vote, while another had just been
confirmed to the Court and had not participated in hearing this dispute). Justice Hugo Black
wrote the opinion for the Court, stating that the prayer did in fact constitute an unconstitutional
establishment of religion. In the ruling the Court interpreted the First Amendment to mean that
government could not sponsor religious activity, regardless of whether that religious activity did
or did not favor a particular religious sect— a question deemed irrelevant in the Court’s decision.
Additionally, it did not matter that the prayer was voluntary since, the Court argued, coercion
was not required for a violation of the Establishment Clause. Government sponsorship of
religion, alone, was enough to violate the Establishment Clause, and the fact that the prayer was
composed by government and carried out by government was sufficient to consider the school
prayer unconstitutional.29 30
Through its ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court created more issues than it solved. For
instance, the sole dissenting voice on the Court, Justice Potter Stewart, questioned how the Court
could deem the prayer unconstitutional when the justices themselves began each session with a
prayer. The full lyrics to the national anthem, moreover, contain references to a singular deity, as
does U.S. currency, the Declaration of Independence, and the revised Pledge of Allegiance,
which regular school students had been reciting daily since 1954, when the words “under God”
were added. Where would the Court draw the line? 31
31 Engel v. Vitale.
30 Dierenfield 130.




In addition to these seeming logistical and philosophical inconsistencies, the decision in
Engel v. Vitale prompted a fierce public backlash. Several congressional leaders, senators,
cardinals, and religious figures like Billy Graham, made public statements criticizing the ruling
and claiming that the U.S. Supreme Court was attempting to drive God out of public life. In
many states, new billboard signs calling for the impeachment of Chief Justice Earl Warren were
put up. Less than a month after the decision, the Senate decided to hold hearings on the Court’s
decision, and subsequently debated five proposed amendments to the U.S. Constitution. These
amendments would essentially have overturned the ruling in Engel v. Vitale, sanctioning
school-sponsored prayer as well as protecting Bible reading in schools. Though these proposals
did not gain the two-third supermajority needed to send the amendment to the states, they did
illustrate the deep public dissatisfaction that arose from the Engel v. Vitale ruling.32
The U.S. Supreme Court similarly interpreted the Establishment Clause in the First
Amendment a year later in 1963. In that year it ruled on two cases together, Abington School
District v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett. The cases involved public schools leading students in
Bible reading and reciting the Lord’s Prayer in Pennsylvania and Maryland, respectively.
Fundamentally the arguments made were similar to those made in Engel v. Vitale. The plaintiffs
asserted that the schools’ practices were an unconstitutional establishment of religion. The
defendants, on the other hand, claimed that the practices were not primarily religious, rather they
were practices aimed at instilling morality, which happened to use religious elements. Surely,
they reasoned, a practice was not unconstitutional simply because it involved religious materials.
Additionally the defendants, like the defendants in Engel, emphasized that students had not been




The U.S. Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs, ruling in an eight to one decision that
school Bible reading and recitation of the Lord’s Prayer violated the Establishment Clause. In the
opinion for the Court, Associate Justice Tom Clark attempted to reduce public resentment and
outline the Court’s vision for church and state relations. The ruling, he asserted, did not dismiss
the importance of including religious study in one’s education, and did not object to studying the
historic or literary importance of religious materials in schools as part of a secular education. The
Court also introduced a two-part test for whether a practice was constitutional with regards to the
Establishment Clause: it must have a secular purpose, and its primary effect cannot be to further
religion or to hinder it.34 35
Similar to the ruling in Engel v. Vitale, this ruling prompted strong public reactions. Many
religious and political figures opposed the decision, and once more, the Senate Judiciary
Committee met to discuss the cases and propose amendments to overturn the Court’s decision.
One noteworthy fact is that many Americans who rebuked the Court’s decisions in these years
lived in states that did not have prayer or Bible reading in their school systems.36 There is a
possibility, therefore, that these Americans were pacified or content when these kinds of
decisions were made at the state level; a consistent absence of strong public sentiment after
similar state supreme court rulings on this issue might suggest this is the case.
In 1968 the U.S. Supreme Court further expanded its doctrine with regards to church and
state issues with its ruling in Epperson v. Arkansas. The case touched on a particular issue in
religion and public education— the teaching of evolution and creationism. A biology teacher in
Arkansas, Susan Epperson, challenged an old 1928 state law that forbade the teaching of
36 Alley 120-127.
35 Fraser 149.
34 Abington School District v. Schempp (June 17, 1963)
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep374/usrep374203/usrep374203.pdf
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evolution in public schools. The Arkansas State Supreme Court upheld the law, ruling that it was
within the state’s power to choose the public school curriculum. The U.S. Supreme Court,
however, ruled in favor of Epperson, reasoning that the law was enacted for a religious purpose,
that purpose being the prohibition of a theory viewed as antagonistic to religion, and therefore it
violated the Establishment Clause.37 Through this ruling the Supreme Court continued a
consistent interpretation of the Establishment Clause— one that required a strict separation
between church and state.
The Court continued this precedent in Lemon v. Kurtzman in 1971. This case involved a
Pennsylvania law that provided funding for private schools, most of which were Catholic. In an
eight to one decision the Supreme Court struck down the law, ruling that it had violated the
Establishment Clause. It also presented a test for whether a law violated the Establishment
Clause that built upon its Schempp decision: it must have a secular purpose, its primary effect
cannot be to further religion or to hinder it, and it cannot create “an excessive government
entanglement with religion.” 38 39
Through its decision, the Court expanded its developing separation of church and state
doctrine to school funding programs. Like its previous rulings, the Court called once more for a
strict separation between church and state—and, once more, in an almost unanimous decision.
Thirteen years later, in 1984, the Supreme Court ruled in the case Lynch v. Donnelly, where the
vote was more contentious. The case involved a municipality in Rhode Island which erected
nativity scenes of Jesus during the month of December; at issue was whether this constituted an
unconstitutional establishment of religion. Prior to reaching the U.S. Supreme Court, the District
39 Waldman 204.




Court and Court of Appeals had ruled that the municipality’s display of the nativity scene was
unconstitutional. In a five to four ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed these decisions,
asserting that this practice did not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court argued that there
had not been excessive entanglement of government and religion, since the cost of putting up the
nativity scene was negligible and municipal officials had not worked with church authorities.
The Court noted, furthermore, that while the previous ‘tests’ it created were helpful, the Court
was not bound to them. Perhaps most intriguing, the majority held that the nativity display did
have a secular purpose and did not unconstitutionally advance religion. The purpose, the
majority argued, was to celebrate a holiday and national tradition recognized by Congress and to
depict the origins of the holiday. The dissenting justices argued that if the purpose of the practice
was secular, it could have been done without such an explicitly religious symbol. Furthermore
the practice, they asserted, clearly showed government support of one religion over others.
Therefore, they believed the Establishment Clause had surely been violated.40
This case marked a clear shift from the Court’s prior near-unanimous separation of
church and state rulings. It also indicated a turn from its more absolutist interpretation of the
Establishment Clause to a more limited one. After all, the Court’s reasoning in Lynch v. Donnelly
would arguably have found the laws in Engel or Schempp constitutional, which had stated
secular purposes of fostering moral instruction and national unification in the midst of the Cold
War and increasing crime rates.
The U.S. Supreme Court further developed its Establishment Clause interpretation in
Board of Education of Westside v. Mergens. This case involved the Equal Access Act of 1984,
which allowed students to participate in religious clubs, such as Bible reading groups, in public
40 Lynch et al. v. Donnelly et al. (March 5, 1984).
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep465/usrep465668/usrep465668.pdf
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schools after regular instruction had ended. The statute had been designed under the Reagan
Administration, and it shifted the conservative focus from school prayer to this more widely
acceptable idea. Prominent Christian Conservative leader Jerry Falwell stated, for example, that
“we could not win on school prayer, but equal access gets us what we want.” 41 Although the
Bill’s purpose might have been religious for some of its supporters, it was seemingly secular in
form, since it simply called for federally funded schools to provide equal accommodations to
extracurricular student groups.
When students in a Nebraskan school were prevented from forming a Bible study club,
they sued, and in 1990 the U.S. Supreme Court confronted the question of whether the practice
of hosting religious clubs in schools violated the Establishment Clause. In an eight to one
decision the Court ruled that it did not, reasoning that the statute had a clear secular purpose and
that its primary aim was not to advance religion. Furthermore, it did not constitute an
unconstitutional entanglement between government and religion, the Court ruled, since the
school was not sponsoring the religious group, rather it was providing them accommodation as it
had with secular student groups. The Court’s decision was a win for the religious right, and it
demonstrated the Court’s continued use of the three-part ‘test’ it had developed in Lemon.42
In 1992 the George H. Bush Administration had an opportunity to further rein in the strict
separation of church and state doctrine that the U.S. Supreme Court had established in Engel. A
non-practicing Jewish man named Daniel Weisman had been offended that his children’s school
graduation ceremony involved a ceremonial prayer led by clergy that called on attendees to show
their gratitude to Jesus Christ. When Weisman asked for the school to stop using the prayer, the
principal replaced the prayer with one that was “nondenominational,” although in substance it




was similar to the prayer used in Engel. Weisman wanted the prayer removed altogether, and he
sued the school. The fact that there was a presidential election in 1992 heightened the stakes of
the case for both political parties as it made its way to the Supreme Court. U.S. Solicitor General
Kenneth Starr and Justice Department attorneys, including John Roberts who would go on to
serve as Chief Justice on the Supreme Court, argued that the Court should interpret the
Establishment Clause as prohibiting the favoring of one religion over another and the
compulsion of religious activity. However, they also noted that this case was different from
Engel. A classroom is an instructional environment, whereas a graduation ceremony was
celebratory; therefore, they argued, the students were not coerced to participate in the prayer as
they had been in Engel.43
In its five to four decision on Lee v. Weisman, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of
Weisman. Justice Anthony Kennedy had been the deciding vote and wrote the opinion for the
Court. Like its ruling in Engel, the Court decided that the prayer violated the Establishment
Clause, since it had been composed and given under the direction of the school. Unlike its ruling
in Engel, the Court emphasized the fact that coercion of religious activity violated the
Establishment Clause, and that this was central to the case. Kennedy disagreed with the
defendants that a graduation ceremony’s environment made the prayer non-coercive; while it was
true that students could choose not to attend the ceremony, this was not an acceptable
accommodation for them, Kennedy wrote, given the social importance of graduation
ceremonies.44
Through its decision the Supreme Court continued to hold that school-led prayer violated
the Establishment Clause, but now by a far closer margin than it had before and by using a




different test— one that looked more to the level of coercion. As for public opinion, the ruling
continued a pattern of strong dissatisfaction with the Court’s Establishment Clause interpretation.
Congressman Ernest Istook (R-OK), for example, proposed the Istook Amendment a few years
later. The Amendment would re-interpret the First Amendment as more protective of religion in
public spheres, and it specifically protected prayer in public schools. Although the Amendment
did not gain the two-third vote needed to pass the House, it did have the support of a majority of
representatives.45 Additionally, a question remained for the Court: if the Court’s ruling was that
government support of religion was unconstitutional— not just government support of a
particular religion over others— then did references to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, or in
other government composed or directed forms, also violate the Establishment Clause?
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court would have a chance to answer that question in the case
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow. The case involved an atheist named Michael
Newdow, who sued his daughter’s school for leading students in saying the Pledge of Allegiance.
Newdow was troubled by the phrase “one nation under God,” and he believed it violated the
Establishment Clause. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ruled in favor of
Newdow, deciding that the phrase did violate the Establishment Clause. Before the case reached
the Supreme Court, however, there was an immense show of public disapproval regarding the
Ninth Circuit’s ruling. In addition to rebukes from many religious leaders, members of Congress
on both sides of the aisle expressed their opposition to the decision. The House of
Representatives passed a resolution opposing the ruling by a margin of 416 to 3 and many
members further protested it by reciting the Pledge of Allegiance on the Capitol steps. The
45 Dierenfield 206-207.
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Senate also expressed disapproval with the decision, passing a resolution affirming support for
the Pledge’s phrasing by a unanimous vote.46
Whether or not this strong public disapproval influenced the Supreme Court is unclear; it
is clear, however, that the majority of the Court refused to answer the case’s underlying
constitutional question. Five members of the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but
only on a technicality. Although Michael Newdow shared custody of his daughter with her
mother, the mother had been given sole legal custody of the daughter at the time Newdow filed
the case. The five ruled that as a noncustodial parent, Michael Newdow did not have standing in
federal court. The three other justices also ruled to reverse the Ninth Circuit’s decision, but they
held that Newdow did have standing. Therefore, they decided to answer the constitutional
question of whether the phrase “one nation under God” violated the Establishment Clause.47
All three dissenting justices, (one, Associate Justice Antonin Scalia, had recused himself
from the case after publicly commenting on it earlier), wrote that the phrasing in the Pledge was
constitutional. They all agreed, however, for different reasons. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that
the phrasing was constitutional because the Pledge was expressing allegiance to the U.S., and the
few words which referenced God could hardly be taken as an establishment of religion; rather in
context, he argued, it was simply an expression of the nation’s historical heritage. Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, in contrast, pursued an “endorsement test,” which considered whether a law or
practice constituted government endorsement of religion. In this case, she wrote, it did not.
Justice Clarence Thomas, on the other hand, argued that the Establishment Clause only applied
to the federal government, not the states— effectively disagreeing with the Court’s ruling in
47 Elk Grove Unified School District et al. v. Newdow et al. (June 14, 2004).
https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep542/usrep542001/usrep542001.pdf
46 With, David Stout. "Congress Defiant Over Ban on Pledge of Allegiance." The New York Times. June 27, 2002.
https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/27/national/congress-defiant-over-ban-on-pledge-of-allegiance.html.
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Everson. He also believed the phrasing in the Pledge of Allegiance could not be considered
“coercive” in the way the Court had used the term in prior decisions. Additionally, all three
dissenting justices agreed— the majority had used “a novel… standing principle in order to
avoid reaching the merits of the constitutional claim.” Each also expressed frustration and
disagreement with the Court’s past rulings on Establishment Clause issues.48
Recent cases outside the realm of education demonstrate the ongoing debate over the
Establishment Clause. In 2005, the Court ruled on two very similar cases in the opposite manner.
In the case McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, copies of the Ten
Commandments had been displayed in a public school and a few courthouses. The Court ruled
that these displays violated the Establishment Clause, since they served a religious purpose and
no secular purpose was apparent. The Court was split, however, five to four on the decision. The
dissenting opinion reasoned that the Establishment Clause restricted favoring one religion over
another, not favoring religion over secularization. Furthermore, the Ten Commandments display
did not favor one religion over another, the dissenting justices reasoned, since nearly all
Americans were Christian, Jewish, or Muslim, and each of those religions recognized the Ten
Commandments.49
In contrast, the Court ruled five to four in the case Van Orden v. Perry, on the same day of
its McCreary decision, that a Ten Commandments monument at the Texas State Capitol did not
violate the Establishment Clause. The difference in the Court’s decision came from the fact that
Justice Stephen Breyer, this time, joined with the 4 dissenters from McCreary County. The
opinion in this case emphasized the historical importance of the Ten Commandments and the
context within which the monument was put up. It had been donated, for instance, by the Texas
49 "McCREARY COUNTY v. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF KY." Legal Information Institute.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/03-1693.
48 Elk Grove Unified School District et al. v. Newdow et al.
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Eagle Scouts several decades prior. Justice Breyer wrote his own opinion, concurring with the
majority. He took a number of different factors into account, such as the monument being a
donation and its placement in a large park containing other kinds of historical markers on the
grounds surrounding the Texas Capitol. Consequently, he concluded that the monument’s
message was not primarily religious; rather, it was primarily a secular message of history and
morality. He admitted, however, that it was a borderline case.50
A case in 2014 also demonstrates the continued ambiguity in the Court’s Establishment
Clause interpretation. A town in New York state called Greece had been opening its town board
meetings with a prayer led by local clergy. Since the majority of religious congregations in the
town were Christian, the only clergy who had led prayers from 1999 to 2007 had been Christian.
Although the prayers sometimes focused on civic themes, at other times they were distinctly
Christian in nature. Two local residents subsequently sued in 2010, asserting that the practice
violated the Establishment Clause. Although the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the
Clause had been violated, the Supreme Court reversed that decision in a five to four ruling.51
The majority reaffirmed, (as it had in the 1983 case Marsh v. Chambers), that legislative
prayer was constitutional, since it was a national tradition going back to when the Constitution
was ratified. Perhaps more interesting, however, was that the Court ruled that opening a
government session with a sectarian prayer was constitutional as long as it did not try to
condemn or convert people of another religion and the governing body was indiscriminate in
choosing who gave the prayer. Furthermore, the Court’s ruling in the case, (Town of Greece v.
Galloway), asserted that a legislative prayer could not be considered coercive simply because
individuals did not want to hear it; as long as they were not forced to participate, the prayer was
51 "Town of Greece v. Galloway." Harvard Law Review. November 10, 2014.
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/11/town-of-greece-v-galloway/.
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not impermissibly coercive. This seemed in contrast to some of the Court’s prior rulings. In Lee
v. Weisman, for example, the graduation prayer had been ruled unconstitutionally coercive even
though those attending were not forced to participate in it.52
The U.S. Supreme Court’s increasingly narrow rulings on Establishment Clause cases
suggests its doctrine in this constitutional area remains unsettled. The variety of reasonings and
tests— from the three-part test in Lemon to O’Connor’s endorsement test to a coercion test to
rulings which emphasize history and tradition— further make this issue unclear. Additionally,
important considerations, such as the constitutionality of a theological reference in the Pledge of
Allegiance, have not been put to rest. It is also important to note the diversity of Establishment
Clause cases that continue to come before the Supreme Court— from cases involving prayer in
public settings, to those concerning monuments on public property, to cases that concern public
funds being provided to religious schools. This steady stream of legal disputes in the federal
courts constitutes the clearest sign that constitutional doctrine in this area remains unsettled.
6. California’s Supreme Court: A History of Religion and Education Cases
California is notable in a few ways which are important for understanding its religion and
education cases. Its Christian population, for starters, is a lesser proportion of the state than the
national average, but has a greater proportion of Catholics. In part this is due to the significant
number of Catholic hispanics who have historically immigrated there, especially from Mexico.
While 70.6% of the U.S. is Christian and 20.8% of those are Catholic, for example, the Christian
population in California is 63% of the state with 28% of those being Catholic.53 This is important
53 "Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Statistics." Pew Research Center's Religion &
Public Life Project. September 09, 2020. https://www.pewforum.org/religious-landscape-study/.
52 Town of Greece, New York v. Galloway et al. (May 5, 2014).
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-696_bpm1.pdf
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to note when it comes to considering cases, since issues involving public funding for private,
religious schools often involve Catholic parochial schools.
Additionally, acknowledging California's proximity to East Asia and its history of using
the labor of migrants from that region is important for understanding its contemporary religious
makeup. As a result, for instance, it has a greater proportion of people from non-Christian faiths
than the national average, particularly larger Buddhist and Hindu populations.54 55 This
consideration is important for cases involving a sectarian prayer, monument, or other issue, since
the dominance of Abrahamic religions in the U.S. has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court in
its justification of certain practices; for example, the dissenting opinion in McCreary regarded
the Ten Commandments as essentially non-denominational in the United States, since the vast
majority of religious Americans are either Christian, Jewish, or Muslim.
Examining the Supreme Court of California itself is also important for analyzing its
rulings. The Supreme Court of California consists of seven justices who are nominated by
California’s governor. Once appointed, these justices are placed on the ballot every gubernatorial
election, where voters decide whether or not to retain them.56 Whether or not California voters
decided to retain a justice is a valuable indicator of the public’s satisfaction— or more accurately
the public’s dissatisfaction— regarding how a justice, and the Supreme Court of California more
generally, handled cases. Justices are often, seemingly by default, retained by voters in
California; however, this does not invalidate using retention elections as an indicator. If a ruling
causes a high degree of dissatisfaction amongst voters, Californians have demonstrated their
56 Global Reach Internet Productions, LLC - Ames. "American Judicature Society / Judicial Selection in the States -
Promoting the Effective Administration of Justice." Judicial Selection in the States.
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=.
55 Pew Research Center's Religion & Public Life Project.
54 Ernst, Eldon G. “The Emergence of California in American Religious Historiography.” Religion and American
Culture: A Journal of Interpretation, vol. 11, no. 1, 2001, pp. 31–52. JSTOR.
www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/rac.2001.11.1.31. Accessed 4 Feb. 2021.
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willingness to vote justices out. In 1986, for example, three justices—Chief Justice Rose Bird,
and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso— were targeted in their retention
elections after ruling against the death penalty in a number of cases. Prior to their retention
elections, their opponents aired television commercials in which parents of murdered children
denounced the justices for refusing to apply the death penalty to their children’s killers.
Subsequently all three justices were removed by voters.57 More recently justices have been
targeted for their rulings on abortion.58 Consequently, the retention of a justice can indicate that
their ruling on a given issue was not unpopular enough for them to be voted out. None of the
following cases, however, became an issue in any of the justices’ retention elections.
One of the first cases regarding religion and education that came before California’s
Supreme Court since Engel involved the use of public funds for a private, religious university. In
1973, California’s legislature had created an entity called the California Educational Facilities
Authority in order to help private universities in the state develop their educational facilities. The
Authority would aid universities by issuing tax-exempt bonds, which would provide these
institutions with financing at lower than normal interest rates.59 In 1974, the year after the
Authority was created, the University of Pacific requested to receive such financing from the
Authority, but California’s Treasurer, Ivy Priest, refused to sell the bonds. The University of
Pacific is a private, Methodist institution, and Priest believed that providing government
financing for Pacific constituted government support of religion and thus violated the
Establishment Clause. When the University of Pacific was refused the funds, it sued, and the
59 "Introduction." CEFA Introduction. https://www.treasurer.ca.gov/cefa/introduction.asp.
58 Global Reach Internet Productions.
57 Lindsey, Robert. "DEUKMEJIAN AND CRANSTON WIN AS 3 JUDGES ARE OUSTED." The New York




case California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest made its way before California’s
Supreme Court.60
The Court had to consider not only the U.S. Constitution, but also California’s
Constitution, which states “No public money shall ever be appropriated for the support of any
sectarian or denominational school.” 61 State constitutions often have unique, specific provisions
not found in the U.S. Constitution, and the constitutionality of the law depended on it meeting
this standard.
Justice Stanley Mosk, who wrote the Court’s unanimous opinion, had been appointed by
a Democratic governor and, perhaps unusual for the time, he did not himself have a religious
upbringing. He wrote that the law was constitutional at both the federal and state level. In regards
to the U.S. Constitution, the opinion followed the three-part test from Lemon, where the U.S.
Supreme Court had ruled against a law funding private, religious schools. First, California’s
Court determined that the law clearly had a secular purpose, since it was aimed at expanding
collegiate educational opportunities. Second, it likewise found that the primary effect of the law
did not advance or inhibit religion. Third, California’s Supreme Court determined that the law
did not excessively entangle the government with religion in pursuing this secular purpose.62 63
Additionally, the Court ruled that the law did not violate California’s Constitution, since
the funding was not for any facilities that would be used in a sectarian way, such as classroom
buildings where religious instruction would be held, which it would deem unconstitutional. The
63 California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest.
62 "Stanley Mosk / California Supreme Court History: Justices: CSCHS." California Supreme Court Historical
Society. March 14, 2017. https://www.cschs.org/history/california-supreme-court-justices/stanley-mosk/.
61 § 8. Appropriation for sectarian schools; Instruction in denominational doctrines, Cal Const, Art. IX § 8
(Deering's California Codes are current through Chapter 4 of the 2021 Regular Session, including all urgency
legislation effective February 22, 2021 or earlier.).
advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem:5JBS-
1481-DXC8-22G2-00000-00&context=1516831. Accessed Feb. 5, 2021.
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Authority was not simply giving public funds to institutions, the Court further noted, it was
issuing bonds, and the University still had an obligation to pay the money back. Through this
ruling, the Supreme Court of California used the same test crafted by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Lemon just a few years prior, but permitted the government’s funding program.64
Later, in 1979, the Supreme Court of California decided the case Rankins v. Commission
on Professional Competence of Ducor Union School District, which involved a school teacher
named Thomas Byars. Byars first started teaching in the Ducor Union School District in 1969,
where he taught elementary students. In 1971, just a couple of years after he had begun, Byars
joined a church called the Worldwide Church of God. It was a church formed by Herbert
Armstrong, a radio and televangelist, whose congregation shared many unorthodox positions.
For instance, Armstrong would explain to his followers that most Christians observed the
Sabbath on Sunday due to Pagan origins, and that it was wrong to follow this practice. Rather,
his followers observed the Sabbath from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, and congregants
did not work during that time. Likewise, congregants refrained from work on many Chrisitan
holidays, which the Worldwide Church of God recognized on calendar days that were different
from when they were normally observed. 65 66
When Byars became a congregant, he requested accommodation from the school district,
so that he could be absent on those days. The Ducor Union School District excused Byars from
teaching on Friday evenings and would also excuse him on one or two holidays per year.
However, Byars insisted on observing more of his Church’s observed holidays, and every year he
submitted requests to the District for absence on additional days. The District always denied
66 Rankins v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence of Ducor Union Sch. Dist.
65 Armstrong, H. W. (1976). Ch.2: Who Made and Established the Sabbath. Which Day Is the Christian sabbath?
Worldwide Church of God.
64 California Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest.
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these requests. Byars, nevertheless, always took these days off, unexcused. He did, however,
ensure a substitute teacher would be present on those days, and he prepared lesson plans for the
substitute. In March 1973, the District notified Byars that they disapproved of his actions and
that, if he continued, he would be terminated from his position. Byars did continue and,
consequently, the District notified him at the end of the academic year in 1975 of their intent to
dismiss him. A hearing was held before a commission on professional competence, which sided
with Byars and determined that his absences did not have a detrimental effect on his students.
The commission further reported that firing Byars would violate his rights protected by the U.S.
Constitution and by California’s Constitution. As a result of this decision, the District sued the
commission, and the case made its way before the Supreme Court of California.67 68
The Court sided with the commission, and therefore also with Byars. The ruling,
however, was split by a vote of four to three. All four justices in the majority were appointed by
Democratic governors; in contrast, two of the dissenting justices were appointed by a Republican
governor, Ronald Reagan, and the third dissenting justice was appointed by a Democratic
governor. In the opinion, the majority cited California’s Constitution, which states that a “person
may not be disqualified from entering or pursuing a business, profession, vocation, or
employment because of sex, race, creed, color, or national or ethic origin.” 69 The school district
had violated this protection since, the majority determined, it was seeking to disqualify Byars on
the basis of his creed. Though his unexcused absences were the basis for his termination, the
majority reasoned that forcing his presence on days observed by his religion was, in effect,
69 § 8. Employment discrimination, Cal Const, Art. I § 8 (Deering's California Codes are current through Chapter 4
of the 2021 Regular Session, including all urgency legislation effective February 22, 2021 or earlier.).
https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/api/document?collection=statutes-legislation&id=urn:contentItem
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68 “Rankins v. Commission on Professional Competence.” Justia Law,
law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/24/167.html.
67 Rankins v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence of Ducor Union Sch. Dist.
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discrimination on the basis of religion. Furthermore, the majority claimed accommodating Byars
was not a violation of the Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution, since the primary
purpose of such a practice would not be favoring a religion, but promoting equality among all
religions. Lastly, the majority asserted that this was a reasonable accommodation, since there was
no difficulty in finding substitute teachers.70
The three dissenting justices ruled that the school district had done nothing wrong by
seeking to terminate Byars. They argued that California’s Constitution protected Byars from
being terminated on the basis of his religion, but distinguished that right from a right to
accommodation of his religion— which the dissenting justices claimed did not exist. They
further held that by accommodating him, the school district would be violating the Establishment
Clause of the U.S. Constitution; by accommodating Byars, they reasoned, the district would be
respecting the establishment of his religion.71 This case is notable for its deference to religious
rights, and religion generally, which the Court had also exhibited in Priest.
In 1981, California’s Supreme Court again took a case that, like California Educational
Facilities Authority v. Priest, involved the issue of religious institutions receiving public funding.
A California law had been enacted in 1976, which provided funds so that textbooks used in
public schools could be lent to students attending private schools. In effect, these textbooks
mostly were loaned to religious, and primarily Catholic, schools. Subsequently a teachers
association, concerned that public funds were going to private, religious schools rather than
public ones, challenged the constitutionality of the law. California’s Supreme Court did not rule
on the constitutionality of the issue as pertaining to the U.S. Constitution, citing the U.S.
Supreme Court’s unclear stance on the issue; rather, it focused on whether the law was
71 Rankins v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence of Ducor Union Sch. Dist.
70 Rankins v. Comm'n on Prof'l Competence of Ducor Union Sch. Dist.
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constitutional under California’s Constitution, which forbids using public funds for religious
schooling.72
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court of California ruled that the law was
unconstitutional with regards to California’s Constitution. The Court determined that the law
directly provided public money to religious schools, and therefore violated California’s explicit
constitutional provision barring such practices. Importantly the Court distinguished this case,
California Teachers Association v. Riles, from Priest. In the latter, the Court argued that aid was
being provided only to universities where students were not required to receive religious
instruction and public money was not being directly given. Therefore, according to the Court,
that case was different, and California’s Constitutional provision had not been violated.73 The
ruling in Riles was thereby consistent with the Court’s earlier rationale on this issue, but did
demonstrate some of the limits in terms of what was constitutionally permissible in this area of
law.
In 1991, the Supreme Court of California reviewed a case similar to Lee v. Weisman,
which the U.S. Supreme Court would decide soon after. The case involved Morongo Unified
School District, which operated four schools, each of which included prayers during their
graduation ceremonies. The individual schools each independently decided who would speak at
their graduation ceremonies, but all of the schools had either a Catholic priest or a Protestant
minister giving the prayer. The prayers themselves often included references to a “heavenly
Father” or “the Lord.” Two residents in the district, Jim Sands and Jean Bertolette, requested that
Morongo stop having prayers at graduation ceremonies. However, the school district refused to
stop the practice and, as a consequence, Sands and Bertolette sued. By selecting graduation
73 Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Riles.
72 Cal. Teachers Ass'n v. Riles.
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prayers and clergy to recite them, the plaintiffs argued that Morongo had unconstitutionally
entangled government and religion, violating the Establishment Clause and California’s
Constitution.74
California’s Supreme Court ruled five to two in this case, Sands v. Morongo Unified
School District, that the graduation ceremony prayer violated the Establishment Clause in the
U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of California made this ruling as Lee v. Weisman was
being decided by the U.S. Supreme Court— which would ultimately rule the same way. The five
justices in the majority in Sands each wrote separate opinions, but each agreed that graduation
prayers did not pass the U.S. Supreme Court’s three-part test in Lemon: the prayers’ primary
effect was conveying a message that favored religion, and the District’s involvement in selecting
the prayer and speakers excessively entangled government and religion. Chief Justice Malcolm
Lucas, who was in the majority and wrote a concurring opinion, also noted the degree of
ambiguity existent at the federal level in this area of law, writing that “recent United States
Supreme Court decisions [make clear that] the law is in a state of flux in this area.” 75
Amidst federal ambiguity, one might expect states to lean more towards interpreting their
state constitutions on a given matter, since they have freedom in interpreting their state
constitution; therefore it might come as a surprise that the majority in this case decided not to
rule on the constitutionality of the graduation prayers under the Californian Constitution, despite
it having an establishment clause almost identical to the federal one. A couple of justices in the
majority thought that California’s constitutional provision had been violated, but more thought it
75 "Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library."
74 "Stanford Law School - Robert Crown Law Library." Supreme Court of California.
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prudent to only answer the federal question— since the prayer violated the federal constitution,
there was no need to reach the state constitutional issue.76
The most recent case involving religion and education to come before California’s
Supreme Court is California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons
Interested etc., which the Court decided in 2007. Unlike the previous cases that came before the
Court, this one was not initiated by an actual dispute between two parties. Rather, the California
Statewide Community Development Authority wanted to issue tax-exempt bonds to help finance
religious schools and filed a petition asking the courts to validate the transaction. By issuing
these bonds, religious schools would save millions of dollars in building their educational
facilities.77 California’s Supreme Court noted that this case was different from California
Educational Facilities Authority v. Priest, however, because this case involved schools that were
“pervasively sectarian,” whereas the university in Priest was simply religiously affiliated. One of
the schools involved in California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons
Interested etc., for example, admitted students based, in part, on their church involvement, and
the other two schools involved in the case required faculty members to adhere to a Christian
faith.78
The Supreme Court of California primarily focused on the constitutionality of the bond
issuance under California’s Constitution, which prohibits appropriating public funds for religious
schooling. The Court was split on this matter. In a vote of four to three, it ruled that the bond
issuance would not violate California’s Constitution. The degree to which a school was religious
in nature, the majority wrote, was not a determining factor with regards to the constitutionality of
78 California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc.
77"California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested in the Matter of the Validity
of the Purchase Agreement: ACLU of Northern CA." ACLU of Northern California. April 07, 2005.
https://www.aclunc.org/our-work/legal-docket/california-statewide-communities-developement-authority-v-all-perso
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the bond issuance under California’s Constitution. Rather, what mattered was that the school
offered a broad curriculum with enough secular subjects to facilitate the government’s goal of
advancing secular education— whether or not religion benefited incidentally was unimportant.
As in Priest, the Court ruled that schools could not use the money received from the bond
issuance to construct facilities that would be used for religious purposes. Additionally, the Court
noted that in issuing tax-exempt bonds, the government was not actually providing money to the
schools— it was simply providing them with a cheaper way to borrow funds. The three
dissenting justices, in contrast, argued that California’s Constitution was clear: no aid could be
used to support a school controlled by a sectarian institution. In their minds, California’s
Constitution was unambiguous, and issuing the bonds to aid religious institutions was
unconstitutional.79
An additional case outside the realm of education, Fox v. Los Angeles, concerned the
Establishment Clause, and it is important to note. Los Angeles city officials had permitted the
display of a cross at city hall during Christmas and Easter holidays for over thirty years.
Eventually, residents of the city sued, claiming the display violated the Establishment Clause and
California’s own constitutional provisions. In 1978, the case made its way before California’s
Supreme Court— six years before the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the
nativity scene in Lynch v. Donnelly. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court of California
acknowledged that the U.S. Supreme Court had treated Establishment Clause cases with a
“perplexing diversity of views,” and chose to only examine whether the display violated
California’s constitutional provisions. California’s Constitution has an almost verbatim
establishment clause: “The [Californian] Legislature shall make no law respecting an
79 California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons Interested etc.
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establishment of religion.”80 With regards to its own constitution, the Court found that the display
was unconstitutional, since it considered the practice an action that respected the establishment
of Christianity; additionally, the Court found that the government had not been practicing a
position of neutrality, which the Court deemed necessary under California’s Constitution.81
7. Ohio’s Supreme Court: A History of Religion and Education Cases
Generally speaking, Ohio’s religious makeup is similar to that in the rest of the country,
though a slightly greater proportion of its Christian population is Protestant and slightly lesser
proportion is Catholic.82 Also noteworthy is that Ohio has the second largest Amish population in
the country, and up until 2000, had the largest in the country.83 84 Ohio’s location in the Midwest
and its more conservative electorate are also notable factors that differentiate the Buckeye state
from California and Virginia for the purpose of examining religion and education cases.
Additionally important, Ohio’s Supreme Court is composed of seven justices who are elected on
a nonpartisan ballot to six year, renewable terms. None of the cases that will be discussed
became a point of issue for a justice seeking re-election. Furthermore, the Governor of Ohio only
plays a role in selecting justices when there is a vacancy on the Court.85
The first case regarding religion and education that came before the Supreme Court of
Ohio after Engel was Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v.
Essex in 1971. Ohio’s Department of Education had been distributing money to private schools
85 "The Supreme Court of Ohio & The Ohio Judicial System." Justices of the Supreme Court of Ohio.
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/SCO/justices/default.asp.
84 Kraybill, D. B. (1989). The riddle of Amish culture. Baltimore, MD.: Johns Hopkins University Press.
83 Amish Studies. August 26, 2020. http://groups.etown.edu/amishstudies/statistics/statistics-population-2020/.
82 "Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Statistics."
81 Fox v. Los Angeles, 22 Cal. 3d 792, 587 P.2d 663, 150 Cal. Rptr. 867, 1978 Cal. LEXIS 321 (Supreme Court of
California December 15, 1978 ). https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.ohio-state.edu/api/document?collection=cases
&id=urn:contentItem:3S11-S280-003C-R0WH-00000-00&context=1516831.
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in order to help fund the education and care of deaf and disabled students. The money was used
for secular purposes, such as providing testing and counseling programs, audio and visual aids,
and services for physically handicapped students. However, funds were granted to religious
schools and, as a result, the group Protestants and other Americans United for Separation of
Church and State sued the state government. This organization had been created in 1947 to
combat government support of religious education.86 In addition to deciding whether Ohio’s
Department of Education had violated the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court of Ohio also
had to consider whether one of Ohio’s Constitutional provisions had been violated. Ohio’s
Constitution states that “no religious or other sect… shall ever have any exclusive right to, or
control of, any part of the school funds of this state.87 88
In its ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined that Ohio’s Department of Education
had not violated Ohio’s Constitution nor the Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution. The
Court was unanimous in its opinion. Ohio’s Department of Education had not violated Ohio’s
Constitution, according to the ruling, since the mere fact that some religious schools incidentally
benefited did not mean the schools had an exclusive right to or control over any part of the
school funds of the state. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Ohio determined the Establishment
Clause had not been violated, since the materials and services funded were not used for a
religious purpose and the funding did not excessively entangle government and religion.
Looming over the Court, however, was the recently decided Lemon case, where the U.S.
Supreme Court struck down a law that provided funds to parochial schools.
88 Protestants & Other Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Essex.
87 § 2 School funds., Oh. Const. Art. VI, § 2 ( Current through January 1, 2021 ).
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The Supreme Court of Ohio distinguished Lemon from this case, however, arguing that
that case involved a far greater degree of entanglement between church and state. In Lemon, for
example, the law required the government to extensively audit and inspect data from the
parochial schools. Furthermore, public funds had been used to pay for teachers in the parochial
schools, and an excessive entanglement of government and religion had been required to ensure
those teachers’ ‘religious neutrality.’ In these ways Ohio’s Supreme Court differentiated Lemon
and subsequently ruled in a manner that, in contrast, upheld the government’s use of funds. 89
Another case, State v. Whisner, involved education and free exercise of religion issues,
and it came before Ohio’s Supreme Court in 1976. The case concerned a group of parents who
had sent their children to Tabernacle Christian School, a private, religious school in Bradford,
Ohio. The school was led by born again Christians, who believed deeply in teaching detachment
from worldly, sinful desires such as gambling or drinking. As a result, the school promised to
provide students with a strong moral and spiritual foundation— something that attracted many of
the parents involved in the case to the school. Importantly, Tabernacle Christian School sought to
achieve this goal by allocating a portion of school time to Bible studies and spiritual training. In
trying to carve out time for this purpose, however, the school was faced with a challenge. Ohio’s
Board of Education had prescribed strict minimum standards to which all schools, public and
private, had to adhere; one requirement was that schools had to allocate instructional time so that
four-fifths of instructional time was used for teaching core subjects, such as mathematics,
language-arts, social studies, and science, and one-fifth was used for subjects such as physical
education, music, or art.90 91
91 Carper, J. (1982). The Whisner Decision: A Case Study in State Regulation of Christian Day Schools. Journal of
Church and State, 24(2), 281-302. Retrieved March 9, 2021, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23916829
90State v. Whisner.
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Consequently, this proportional standard did not allow time for instruction in religious
training, and thus greatly restricted the extent to which the school could engage in such teaching.
Tabernacle Christian School, as a result, did not follow the state’s standards, and it was not
accredited. Thereafter, the state sued a group of parents who had sent their children to the school,
citing their failure to send their children to a school that met the state’s minimum standards. The
parents, in their defense, claimed that those standards violated their First Amendment rights
under the U.S. Constitution, which protects the free exercise of religion, and their rights under
Ohio’s Constitution, which similarly protects one’s freedom of conscience and of worship.
Ultimately the issue came before Ohio’s Supreme Court.92 93
The Supreme Court of Ohio ruled four to two, (with the Chief Justice not participating),
that Ohio’s minimum education standard had violated the parents’ rights under the U.S.
Constitution and Ohio’s Constitution. The rationale employed by the Court was the same for
both constitutions. The minimum education standard, the majority ruled, had gone too far in
restricting religious schools and parents’ ability to practice their religion; the Court importantly
decided, for example, that religious rights can only be restricted if there is no other reasonable
way to achieve the State’s secular goal. Ohio’s Department of Education, according to the Court,
failed to demonstrate that a less religiously restrictive standard that also met the state’s secular
educational goal could not be applied.94
In 1999, the case Simmons-Harris v. Goff would once more present Ohio’s Supreme
Court with a constitutional question regarding public funds going towards religious schools.
Ohio’s General Assembly had passed an appropriations bill which, in part, established a school
voucher program called the Pilot Project Scholarship Program. The legislature created the
94State v. Whisner.
93§ 7 Rights of conscience; education; necessity of religion and knowledge., Oh. Const. Art. I, § 7.
92State v. Whisner.
41
program in order to aid students in Cleveland’s failing school district. At the time there was a
national push for school choice, which was increasingly heralded by Republican politicians and
religious leaders as the best way to save students in failing school systems, particularly those in
urban areas. This solution faced opposition, however, notably from teachers unions and
congressional Democrats.95 96
The pilot program gave up to $2,250 to families based on need, so that they could pay to
have their child attend a participating private school of their choice instead of the local public
school. Although Ohio was not the first state to enact such a program, it was the first to allow
religious schools to participate. Importantly, religious schools participating in the program could
not refuse a student based on their religious, or non-religious, beliefs. Many who opposed this
program highlighted the fact that public funds were, perhaps unconstitutionally, going towards
religious schooling; more troubling to some, however, was that most of the families in the
program opted to send their children to religiously affiliated schools. Consequently, the ACLU
sued the state of Ohio, alleging that the voucher program violated Ohio’s Constitution and the
Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution. Eventually the case made its way before Ohio’s
Supreme Court.97
In its decision, the Supreme Court of Ohio first acknowledged the ambiguity existent in
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, particularly pointing to the fact that
some justices on the U.S. Supreme Court had challenged the test used in Lemon. Nevertheless,
Ohio’s Supreme Court used Lemon as a framework. Using this method, the Court found Ohio’s
voucher program passed all three requirements, deeming it constitutional under the U.S.
97 "ZELMAN V. SIMMONS-HARRIS: Encyclopedia of Cleveland History.
96 Simmons-Harris v. Goff.
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Encyclopedia of Cleveland History | Case Western Reserve University. May 12, 2018.
https://case.edu/ech/articles/z/zelman-v-simmons-harris.
42
Constitution. First, the Court found it had a secular legislative purpose, which was to further
Cleveland students’ educational opportunities. Second, the primary effect of the legislation was
not religious, the Court ruled, since the government was providing funds to parents and any
support provided to religious schools occurred indirectly through the parents.98
For this same reason the Court decided that, thirdly, the legislation did not excessively
entangle government and religion, since the support was indirect. Likewise, Ohio’s Supreme
Court determined that the fact that most families chose to send their children to religious schools
did not violate the Establishment Clause since, regardless of the effect, the program itself favored
neither religious nor secular schooling.99
In terms of the provisions regarding religion in Ohio’s Constitution, the Supreme Court of
Ohio decided to adopt the Lemon test. Even though states are not bound by the U.S. Supreme
Court when deciding state constitutional law, Ohio’s Supreme Court decided the test in Lemon
was logical and useful, and therefore used it when ruling on the religious provisions in Ohio’s
Constitution. Consequently, they found the program did not violate the provisions regarding
religion in Ohio’s Constitution. Ohio’s Supreme Court did, however, find the program
unconstitutional under a rather obscure provision in Ohio’s Constitution. In Article II of Ohio’s
Constitution, there is a provision requiring that bills cannot contain more than one subject— in
practical effect, this means that the legislature cannot pass bills with sections that are entirely
unrelated from one another. Under this provision the program failed since, the Court noted, it
was written in an appropriations bill that also concerned, among other things, the residency of
elected officials, government contracts, and the financial statements of political candidates. In
99 Simmons-Harris v. Goff.
98 Simmons-Harris v. Goff.
43
other words, as the Court put it, there was a “ considerable disunity in subject matter.” 100 As a
result, the legislation creating the school voucher program was deemed unconstitutional.
The case Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education, which
came before Ohio’s Supreme Court in 2013, is the most recent case involving religion and
education to come before the Court, and it is also one of the most unusual. The case concerned
John Freshwater, an eighth-grade science teacher who, in addition to other topics, taught the
theory of evolution to his students. Freshwater was known as one of his school district’s best
science teachers, and his students consistently received some of the highest scores on the science
section of the state’s standardized tests, which included the topic of evolution. When teaching his
students evolution, however, Freshwater often initiated discussions of creationism and intelligent
design— concepts which use divine explanations to account for genetic diversity in biology.
Freshwater himself was deeply religious, and he gave students pamphlets discussing creationism
and provided extra credit to students who attended creationist seminars. Allegedly, Freshwater
also made comments to his students denigrating the theory of evolution, asserting it was not
supported by the Bible.101 102
Complaints regarding Freshwater’s teaching had come before the school as early as 1994,
however, legal action first arose when Freshwater used a Tesla coil, which conducts electricity, to
create a temporary mark on a student’s arm during a class demonstration. The student’s family
complained, and alleged that the mark was a cross, though Freshwater claimed it was the letter x.
Regardless, the family threatened legal action and demanded that Freshwater remove religious
paraphernalia he had in his classroom, including a Bible on his desk and a poster of the Ten
102 "Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City School District Board of Education." Americans United for Separation of
Church and State.
https://www.au.org/our-work/legal/lawsuits/freshwater-v-mount-vernon-city-school-district-board-of-education.
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100 Simmons-Harris v. Goff.
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Commandments on the wall. Subsequently, the school called for Freshwater to stop teaching
religion in the classroom, and the principal told Freshwater that he had to remove religious items
in the classroom from the sight of students. Freshwater continued to teach creationism; he did,
however, remove the items, but soon thereafter he checked out two books from the school’s
library— the Oxford Bible and Jesus of Nazareth— which he placed on his desk as an act of
defiance. Accordingly, hearings were held and Freshwater was fired for failing to adhere to the
school’s curriculum and for being insubordinate. In turn, Freshwater appealed the decision, and
the case eventually made its way to Ohio’s Supreme Court.103
Through the case, two important constitutional questions were presented to the Court: did
Freshwater’s teaching of creationist concepts and placement of religious items in the classroom
violate the Establishment Clause, and did his firing violate the First Amendment’s provision
regarding the free exercise of religion? With respect to the first question, the Court held that
Freshwater’s placement of religious items on his desk did not violate the Establishment Clause,
since it was his personal space and could not be reasonably interpreted by students as the
school’s endorsement of religion; the Court did not consider the placement of the Ten
Commandments, since Freshwater had taken it down in compliance with the school’s orders, and
it was no longer part of the dispute. Although Freshwater had a right to keep religious items on
his desk, the Court ruled that he had placed the Oxford Bible and Jesus of Nazareth books on his
desk as an act of insubordination, and therefore his termination was justified. As a result, the
ruling found it unnecessary to consider whether Freshwater’s teaching of creationism had
violated the Establishment Clause.104
Four justices formed the majority, though one of them wrote a separate, concurring
104 Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
103 Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
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opinion which, in contrast, held that Freshwater’s placement of religious items in the classroom
did violate the Establishment Clause. The three dissenting justices disagreed with the majority
that Freshwater’s termination was justified. In their view, he had not been insubordinate, since
the school’s demand that he remove his religious items was unconstitutional. Freshwater’s
actions could not be interpreted as insubordinate, they argued, since he was going against an
invalid order. As a result, the three dissenting justices considered whether his teaching violated
the Establishment Clause. The justices cited student accounts that Freshwater had encouraged
students to critically examine evolutionary theory and argued that making comments or
providing handouts involving creationism did not constitute teaching it. As a result, Freshwater’s
teaching did not violate the Establishment Clause, and his termination was unjustified in their
view.105
These are all of the cases regarding the Establishment Clause, not just religion and
education cases, that the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled on since Engel.
8. Virginia’s Supreme Court: A History of Religion and Education Cases
Virginia’s religious makeup is noticeably similar to the national makeup, except for the
fact that a great proportion of the state’s population is Protestant, 58% compared to the national
average of 46.6%, and its proportion of Catholics is smaller, 12% compared to the national
average of 20.8%.106 With regards to the Supreme Court of Virginia’s composition, it has seven
justices who are each appointed to twelve-year terms, and they can be re-appointed perpetually,
though they must retire after their seventy-third birthday. Rather than being appointed by the
governor, as in some states, Virginia’s justices are chosen by a majority vote of each house in
106 "Religion in America: U.S. Religious Data, Demographics and Statistics."
105Freshwater v. Mount Vernon City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
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Virginia’s general assembly. Importantly, none of the justices’ Establishment Clause
interpretations became a point of issue in their retention.107
The first case regarding education and religion that came before Virginia’s Supreme
Court after Engel involved a bill passed by Virginia’s General Assembly in 1972. Virginia had
offered tuition assistance programs to students in public universities in the state. However, this
bill, in part, appropriated funds for a loan program that could be used by students attending
private universities— including religious ones. The loans were repayable in two ways. Students
could, of course, pay them back with money, but the loans were also considered “repaid” if
students made sufficient academic progress. This latter form was considered repayment in
academic work. The comptroller of Virginia, David Ayres, doubted the legality of this program.
For starters, Virginia’s Constitution only permitted aid in the form of loans to students attending
universities, and Ayres questioned whether loans repayable in academic work fit into the
traditional definition of a loan. Furthermore, Virginia’s Constitution only allowed public funds to
go towards non-sectarian institutions; Ayres consequently reasoned that loans provided to
students attending religiously affiliated universities violated this provision, as well as the
Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution.108
The Supreme Court of Virginia ruled unanimously, deciding the bill did not violate the
Establishment Clause but did violate Virginia’s constitutional provisions. With regards to the
Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court of Virginia used the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Schempp as a framework. Virginia’s Supreme Court found that the bill had a secular purpose—
expanding secular educational opportunities— and that this secular purpose was evidenced by
the fact that loans were not provided for religious or theological training. As a result, the Court
108 Miller v. Ayres, 213.
107 "Virginia Law." Constitution of Virginia. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/constitution
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also determined that the primary effect of the bill was secular, not religious. Furthermore, the
nature of providing loans did not, the Court argued, excessively entangle the government with
religion.109
However, the Supreme Court of Virginia found that the bill violated Virginia’s
Constitution, since it considered the loans that were repayable through academic work as being
closer to conditional gifts or grants than actual loans. Consequently, the Court decided that this
violated the state’s constitutional provision, which only allowed for funding in the form of loans.
The Court also ruled that sending grants to sectarian institutions violated the state’s constitutional
provision, which only permitted funding that was appropriated for non-sectarian educational
institutions.110
Soon after the Court’s decision, Virginia’s General Assembly passed the same legislation,
but amended it so that instead of offering the option of repayment in academic work, it allowed
for repayment in five alternative ways after graduation: U.S. military service, residing in Virginia
and working for the state government, residing in Virginia and working for an organization
engaged in non-profit work, and residing in Virginia and working, generally, or not working,
both of which had longer time frames of repayment than the other options. Virginia’s
comptroller, however, refused to issue payment for the program until the new legislation was
adjudicated, and it came before the Court once more. One of the central issues before the Court
was that Virginia’s constitution allowed for loans to be repaid either in the form of money or in
the form of public service to the state of Virginia. The Court had not considered academic
progress as service to Virginia, but the legislature hoped it would interpret these new alternatives
in this way, arguing that each one of them benefitted the state.111
111 Miller v. Ayres, 214.
110 Miller v. Ayres, 213.
109 Miller v. Ayres, 213.
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Therefore the Court had to determine whether the legislature's five alternative methods of
repayment counted as public service; if not, the Court would view the legislation as providing
grants rather than loans, and it would be deemed unconstitutional. In its second ruling on this
legislation, the Court determined that four of the five alternative repayment options could not be
considered public service to Virginia in the sense meant when the constitutional provision was
ratified. Only residing in Virginia and working for the state’s government, the Court ruled, could
count as public service eligible as a form of repayment. Therefore, individuals pursuing any form
of repayment other than paying the loan back in money or working for Virginia’s government
were viewed in the eyes of the Court as receiving a grant.112
Virginia’s Supreme Court, consequently, struck down these parts of the loan program.
However, the new bill had a severability clause. Therefore, the Court upheld loans that were
repaid in money or through residence and work for the state government. This included loans to
sectarian universities since loans were not considered, according to Virginia’s Supreme Court, as
impermissible public funding for sectarian schools. All in all the Supreme Court of Virginia,
through these complex means, carved out a workable interpretation of the state constitution for
this legislation, which allowed state loans to go towards religious universities.113
In 1991, the Supreme Court of Virginia once more ruled on the constitutionality of public
funding going towards religious institutions. The city of Lynchburg’s Industrial Development
Authority had approved a bond issuance that would allow Liberty University to build and expand
its educational facilities. Liberty University was founded by Jerry Falwell, a televangelist and a
vocal conservative, and a strong religious culture permeated its university life. Students and
faculty, for example, were required to attend religious services. Students lived in dormitories
113 Miller v. Ayres, 214.
112 Miller v. Ayres, 214
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which had several faith leaders and attendance at weekly dormitory prayer meetings was
mandatory. In addition to other religious commitments required by students and faculty, the
university itself had a religious based mission statement.114
In deciding the case, Habel v. Industrial Development Authority, the opinion of Virginia’s
Supreme Court was unanimous and straightforward: the bond issuance violated both the
Establishment Clause in the U.S. Constitution and Virginia’s constitutional provisions. Given
Liberty University’s overwhelmingly religious nature, the Court ruled, government support for
the institution would impermissibly entangle government and religion. Notably, the Supreme
Court of Virginia decided to apply this reasoning in interpreting Virginia’s constitutional
provision as well. Virginia’s Constitution contains an extensive provision regarding separation of
church and state, and the wording regarding the establishment of religion is distinct from the
federal constitution: “the General Assembly shall not… confer any peculiar privileges or
advantages on any sect or denomination.”115 Regardless of the wording, Virginia’s Supreme
Court could interpret its own constitution’s establishment clause differently from the federal
interpretation, and yet it decided to adopt the U.S. Supreme Court’s method, writing “we find the
Supreme Court’s construction of the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment…
helpful and persuasive in this case in construing the analogous state constitutional provision.”116
The most recent case regarding religion and education, Virginia College Building
Authority v. Lynn, was very similar to Habel. It came before the Supreme Court of Virginia in
2000. The Virginia College Building Authority had approved the issuance of bonds, which would
benefit Regent University. Like Liberty University in Habel, Regent University was deemed
116 § 16. Free exercise of religion; no establishment of religion, Va. Const. Art. I, § 16 (Current through the 2020
Special Session I of the General Assembly and Acts 2021, cc. 1 and 2.). https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib
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“pervasively sectarian” for the religious commitments it required from students and faculty, and
its Christian based mission statement. The Supreme Court of Virginia, however, acknowledged
that the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrine regarding public funds and religious institutions had
changed since the Habel case involving Liberty University in 1991. In 1997, the U.S. Supreme
Court had shifted its prior strict separation stance regarding government involvement with
religious universities in the case Agostini v. Felton. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court had
ruled on a program where public school teachers in New York taught in religious schools,
deeming it constitutional as long as their lessons were secular and religiously neutral in nature.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision was split five to four and overturned their prior ruling which
invalidated the same program; in making their decision in Agostini, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided that government aid could constitutionally be given to a religious institution if the
government was providing the aid for a secular purpose.117 118
As a consequence, the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the issuance of bonds
for Regent University was constitutional with regards to the Establishment Clause in the U.S.
Constitution and Virginia’s similar state constitutional provision. Though Regents was a
sectarian university, the government’s purpose in issuing the bonds was to aid in the
development of educational facilities that would be used for its secular curriculum; importantly,
Virginia’s Supreme Court asserted that bonds could not be issued for Regent’s Divinity School,
since the state constitution explicitly prohibited aiding religious training or a theological
education.119
119 Virginia College Bldg. Auth. v. Lynn.
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These are all of the cases regarding the Establishment Clause, not just religion and
education cases, that the Supreme Court of Virginia has ruled on since Engel.
9. Conclusion
Perhaps the most notable feature of this history of cases involving religion and schools,
and the Establishment Clause generally, is the predominance of issues concerning public funds
and religious schools—at least in regards to the state supreme courts in California, Ohio, and
Virginia. Certain cases such as Rankins, Morongo, and Freshwater concern other Establishment
Clause issues; for the most part, however, these issues appear as outliers as the focus regarding
religion and education has trended towards school funding issues. The first Supreme Court case
in which the Court incorporated the Establishment Clause against the states— Everson— also
dealt with religion and school funding issues. In that case the Supreme Court had permitted
funding for the transportation of students to private, religious schools. The Court had made it
clear, however, that it interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring a strict, absolute
separation of church and state— a stance which became realized in Engel.120 The specific ruling
in Engel has remained very much intact; recent rulings at the federal and state level regarding
religion and school funding issues, however, have been more permissive in their language
regarding the separation required between church and state. It is important to note, for example,
that California, Ohio, and Virginia have all permitted some form of state funding to religious,
educational institutions, (as has the U.S. Supreme Court).
The extent to which these state supreme courts have and have not constructed unique
interpretations of their state constitutions in this area is also noteworthy. The supreme courts in
these states have each articulated specific doctrines, particularly with regards to public funds and
sectarian institutions, that are based on unique provisions and restrictions in their state’s
120 Everson v. Board of Education.
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constitution. Moreover California’s Supreme Court, in Fox v. Los Angeles, demonstrated a
willingness to develop its state constitutional doctrine in the midst of federal ambiguity with
regards to the Establishment Clause.
At other times, however, the state supreme courts have— perhaps more often— simply
followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretations in coming up with their own state
constitutional interpretations. In Morongo, for instance, California’s Supreme Court
acknowledged the variance in the U.S. Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause rulings at the
time, but only attempted to decide the case with regards to the U.S. Constitution— abdicating the
chance to develop its own state constitutional doctrine on the issue. For those who want lawyers,
judges, and the public to look more to state constitutions and state supreme courts, an important
question is whether state supreme courts themselves are inclined to initiate state-level solutions
in specific areas of constitutional law, especially when the U.S. Constitution and the relevant
state constitution contain similar provisions.
In terms of variance among the state supreme courts, it is difficult to discern distinct
patterns in their judicial interpretations. Ohio’s history of cases shows a state supreme court that
has been protective of religion; even in Freshwater, where the Supreme Court of Ohio validated
Freshwater’s termination, the Court defended his right to display religious items in the
classroom, and the dissenting justices were protective of his remarks and actions regarding
creationism. California, on the other hand, has a less straightforward record, yet it also dealt with
issues that did not come before Ohio’s Supreme Court, such as graduation prayer— and it was
protective of the religious rights of another teacher, Thomas Byars. The Supreme Court of
Virginia, furthermore, only had cases involving public funds and religious schools. It may be
possible, nevertheless, to regard Ohio’s Supreme Court as having more consistent rulings
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concerning public funds and religious schooling issues in particular. The Supreme Court of Ohio
and the Supreme Court of Virginia have also not had cases involving public aid going towards
religious schools in over twenty years; this may suggest these two courts have been more
successful than the Supreme Court of California and the U.S. Supreme Court in resolving this
issue.
However, it is probably too difficult to claim that any of the three state supreme courts
have a noticeable pattern of ruling in a way that exhibits tailoring to their respective populations
in this area of law. California, for example, has had no non-Christian Establishment Clause cases
despite having a relatively higher proportion of non-Christian religions. This might, nonetheless,
provide insight into how religion and education cases, and church and state issues generally, will
develop going forward at the federal level; for example, despite the growth of non-Christian
religious populations in the U.S. in modern American society, Establishment Clause cases, and
separation of church and state cases broadly, might not reflect those changes if the population
sizes remain low enough. California’s history of cases may also be more reflective of its
growing, predominantly Catholic, Latino population. Furthermore, certain issues such as the
phrasing of the Pledge of Allegiance, have not been resolved by state supreme courts nor the
U.S. Supreme Court and could resurface, (though that seems unlikely under the Roberts Court).
Despite these uncertainties, a state-level perspective seems to at least suggest that the debate
regarding public funds going towards religious schools will likely continue for the foreseeable
future.
Though the histories of California, Ohio, and Virginia in this constitutional area do not
provide a clear indication of the efficacy of state supreme courts in tailoring decisions to their
state’s population nor experimenting with novel constitutional solutions, they do suggest state
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supreme courts may be effective in resolving the issues that have come before them in this area.
The fact that the state supreme courts in Ohio and Virginia, for example, have not had new cases
regarding religion and education, (with the exception of Freshwater), in over twenty years might
indicate their prior rulings in this area were clear enough not to require further rulings. This
seems significant given the continuation of cases regarding religion and education, and the
separation of church and state generally, that come before the U.S. Supreme Court. Admittedly,
the limited number of states examined does not allow for any definitive conclusions; in addition
to providing a state-level account of this constitutional issue, however, hopefully these findings
support the need for further scholarship— regarding this constitutional area, specifically, as well
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